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of  U.S.  Corporations 
THE  VALUE  OF A CORPORATION is known  from  hour  to hour  in the stock 
market.  The performance  of a corporation,  from  the shareholders'  per- 
spective, is measured  by the corporation's  ability  to pay dividends,  now 
and in the indefinite  future. Our research investigates the relation  be- 
tween value and performance. We use modern finance theory as a 
benchmark  for valuation. Finance theory holds that, on average, the 
current  value of a share  is the discounted  value of the future  dividends 
the share  earns. The theory  is explicit about  the discount  rate. If, on av- 
erage, over firms  and over time, shares sell for less than  the discounted 
value of the dividends  the shares  ultimately  pay, it means  that  the stock 
market  undervalues  those shares;  investors require  a higher  rate of re- 
turn  than  theory suggests  they should. 
Our  motivation  for this research  is the persistent  criticism  that  Ameri- 
can capitalism,  with its focus on stock prices determined  by myopic in- 
vestors, diverts  managers  from  efficient,  long-term  investments  toward 
the style of management  most pleasing to the stock market.  We ask if 
certain  managerial  decisions  or firm  characteristics  result  in stock prices 
that  are higher  or lower than  the benchmark  provided  by finance  theory. 
Is the market  systematically  shortsighted  with respect to all activities, 
placing  too little value on deferred  payoffs? Did this problem  worsen 
We are grateful  to Chris  Hall for assistance and to the Econometrics  Laboratory  at 
University  of California,  Berkeley, for massive computations.  This research  was sup- 
ported  in part  by the National  Science Foundation.  We benefited  enormously  from the 
comments  of the discussants  and  others  at the Brookings  Panel  meeting. 
I 2  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
during  the 1980s?  Does the market  favor  higher  current  accounting  earn- 
ings?  Does it put a higher  value on firms  that invest in plant  and equip- 
ment? Does it put a lower value on firms that invest in research and 
development  (R&D), advertising,  and other forms of intangible,  diffi- 
cult-to-value  capital?  Does it put a higher  value on firms  that pay high 
dividends?  All of these are claims  made  by the critics of American  capi- 
talism. 
If the answer  is yes to any of these questions, there  is an unexploited 
opportunity  for arbitrage  in the U.S. stock market.  For example, if the 
market  undervalues  firms  that follow a Japanese-style  strategy  of high 
investment  in product  design and market  penetration,  then an investor 
can  beat  the market  by investing  in these firms  for the long  term,  deriving 
high  net value after  ten or more  years  of holding  the shares  until  the pay- 
off becomes apparent  to other  investors. Central  to the critique  of Amer- 
ican capitalism  is the absence of patient  arbitrageurs  with decade-long 
buy-and-hold  strategies. The whole focus of the professional money 
managers  who dominate  shareholdings  in the United States is on arbi- 
trage  strategies  with payoffs in minutes, hours, or at most months, say 
the critics. 
Our  findings  give strong  but partial  support  to the critique. We find 
statistically  unambiguous  evidence of important  arbitrage  profits  from 
long-term  strategies.  Three  of our  findings  favor the critique. 
First, the stock market  is systematically  shortsighted;  it favors poli- 
cies that generate  near-term  dividends  over those that require  waiting. 
All investors  who place their  funds  in the stock market  rather  than  in the 
bond market  earn large extra rewards  over time after consideration  of 
the relative  riskiness  of stocks and bonds. This finding  confirms  earlier 
well-known  results on the equity premium  puzzle.' Second, although 
the bias against  deferred  payoffs lowers the incentive for investment  of 
all types, the bias is smaller  for investment  in plant  and equipment  than 
for  investments  in intangibles.  Third,  the market  disfavors  intangible  in- 
vestment  in advertising. 
On the other hand, we make three findings  unfavorable  to the cri- 
tique. First, the market  puts a lower value on firms  with higher book 
earnings, after standardizing  for actual subsequent performance. In 
other words, the patient arbitrageur  can make money by buying firms 
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with unusually  high reported  current  earnings  and holding them until 
subsequent  performance  shows that the market  erred  by placing  such a 
low value on these firms. Second, the market  puts a higher value on 
R&D  investment  than  is warranted  by subsequent  performance.  The pa- 
tient arbitrageur  comes out ahead by avoiding R&D-intensive  firms. 
(This  finding  is at a lower  level of statistical  confidence  than  the previous 
ones.) And third,  excess discountsfell in the 1980s  relative  to the 1970s. 
Our work looks at the values of the shares of a sample containing 
about half the publicly traded U.S.  manufacturing  corporations  from 
1964  through  1991.  Within  the framework  of modern  finance  theory, we 
study the relation  between share value and actual subsequent  payouts 
to shareholders.  Our  approach  is an application  of the general  principles 
developed  in Robert  Hall's work  with Steven N. Durlauf.2  The approach 
permits  us to make  rigorous  statements  about  departures  of share  prices 
from the level mandated  by valuation  theory and to associate those de- 
partures  with particular  characteristics  of firms.  Although  our  approach 
puts a predicted  fundamental  value on each firm  in our sample  for each 
year, these valuations  are  quite  noisy. We reach  stronger  conclusions  by 
looking  at statistical  averages  of the difference  between stock prices and 
fundamental  values  over many  stocks and  many  years, which  eliminates 
most of the noise. 
Our  work  is a departure  from  the abundant  recent  literature  on valua- 
tion anomalies.3  That  literature  shows that such a thing  as an underval- 
ued firm  exists. The findings  result  from  a search  for the most successful 
current  variables  for  forecasting  later  performance.  The  best forecasting 
variables  are  invariably  ratios  with  the current  stock price  in the denomi- 
nator.  Thus  the character  of the findings  is that  investment  in stocks with 
high  earnings-price  ratios, high dividend-price  ratios, or high book val- 
ue-price  ratios  will earn  abnormally  high  returns.  The researchers  in this 
tradition  advocate value strategies  and have impressive evidence that 
such strategies  earn  high  returns  when applied  in the real  world. In con- 
trast, we take as given that such a thing  as an undervalued  firm  exists. 
We are interested  in describing  the association of undervaluation  with 
the choices made by the firm's managers.  For example, we are inter- 
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ested in measuring  the undervaluation  of firms  with policies of heavy in- 
vestment  in plant  and  equipment.  To achieve this objective, we must  ex- 
clude the current  stock price  from  our right-hand  variables.  It would be 
uninteresting  in our framework  to conclude that firms  with low stock 
prices suffer high discounting in the stock market, even though the 
stock-picking  rule  that  tells the investor  to look for low stock prices  gen- 
erates the highest expected returns.  Our work is not a contribution  to 
the finance  literature  showing  that  valuation  anomalies  exist. Rather,  we 
apply  the methods  of finance  in a new way to consider  the issues raised 
by the critics of the stock market. 
A second important  warning  to the reader  is that our research  deals 
with the external valuation  of the firm. We can comment on how the 
stock market  responds to the observable variables as they are deter- 
mined  by the firm's  managers.  We cannot comment  on the internal  re- 
sponses to the valuation  errors  made  by the stock market.  For example, 
we show that the market  is shortsighted  with respect to investment;  it 
puts a discount  higher  than  the one merited  by finance  theory  on the sub- 
sequent earnings  from a capital project. We presume, but we do not 
show, that  managers  respond  by launching  too few capital  projects  with 
deferred  payoffs. Our  work  deals with stock market  myopia,  not corpo- 
rate myopia. Of the two major  elements of the case that capitalism  is 
shortsighted,  we consider  only one. 
The restriction  to issues of external valuation  brings clarity to our 
work, we believe. Other  approaches  have to deal with conflicting  inter- 
nal and external influences. For example, Michael Jensen has argued 
that the tendency for a firm's share price to jump when the firm an- 
nounces  an investment  project  is a sign  that  the stock market  is not myo- 
pic, and so managers  driven  by stock market  incentives should not be- 
have myopically.4  But Jeremy Stein observed that the finding  is hardly 
dispositive.5  In his model, managers  behave myopically  in equilibrium. 
They set a hurdle  rate  above the market's  discount  rate, so the adoption 
of a project  generates  a positive gain for the shareholders  precisely be- 
cause of myopia. 
Our  approach  in this paper  is complementary  to the approach  taken 
by Bronwyn Hall in previous work.6  She has studied the relation  be- 
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tween the current  reproduction  cost of a firm's  hardware  and software 
capital (plant and equipment, inventories, ownership of other firms, 
R&D capital, and advertising  capital)  and the total value of the firm's 
debt  and  equity. She estimates  an overall  Tobin's  q, the ratio  of the mar- 
ket value of debt  and  equity  to the reproduction  cost of the firm's  assets. 
This measure  changes sharply  over time, in line with previous  findings. 
Novel in her work is a set of estimates of the premiums  or discounts in 
the valuation  of different  types of capital relative to plant and equip- 
ment. Over the period 1973-91, she finds that inventories, equity in 
other  firms,  and  the intangibles  that  appear  on the balance  sheet all enjoy 
stock market  premiums  over plant  and equipment.  R&D capital  is val- 
ued at a discount  of approximately  50 percent  over the entire  period;  the 
discount changes sharply  in the early 1980s  from around  30 percent to 
roughly  80 percent.  Although  the value  of the discount  is sensitive to the 
depreciation  rate  used in constructing  R&D  capital,  implausibly  high  de- 
preciation  rates (greater  than 50 percent  per year) would be required  to 
place R&D capital  on an equal  footing with plant  and equipment  in this 
framework.  On the other hand, she finds that, during  the same period, 
the market  value of advertising  spending  rose from  zero to parity. 
Examination  of the market value of the firm's assets has the im- 
portant  advantage  that the results can be brought  right  up to date. Our 
method  in this paper  requires  us to wait until  the firm  actually  makes  use 
of its assets to generate  earnings  and  thus dividends.  On the other  hand, 
we can ask a sharper  question  because we look only at the external  valu- 
ation. A finding  that a particular  type of asset suffers a discount in the 
stock market  could tell us that we measured  the asset incorrectly,  that 
managers  are investing  in the asset even though  the market  knows that 
the investment will be unproductive,  or because the market  is short- 
sighted  about  the eventual  payoff  from  the investment.  Our  approach  in 
this paper  focuses cleanly on only the last issue. 
The Benchmark of Finance Theory: Theoretical Framework 
and Example 
Our  framework  examines the relation  between the price of a share 
and the payouts made by a corporation  to the holder  of the share. The 
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ing a time to sell. In addition,  corporations  sometimes  pay dividends  by 
issuing additional  shares to existing shareholders.  We assume that all 
shareholders  are indifferent  between selling and retaining  shares at all 
times, so that we can examine valuation  under standardized  assump- 
tions about the time pattern  of payouts. In so doing, we ignore habitat 
effects that  arise  from  differences  in tax rates  and  other  sources  of share- 
holder  heterogeneity;  these habitat  effects will be part  of the noise in our 
valuation  equation  (surely  a very small  fraction). 
We will explain  our  theoretical  framework  informally,  using  an exam- 
ple based on the Standard  and Poor's (S&P)  500 portfolio.  Appendix  A 
presents  the technical  version  of the framework. 
Robert Shiller  and, simultaneously  and independently,  Stephen Le- 
Roy and  Richard  Porter,  introduced  the idea of relating  the market  value 
of a stock to the present  discounted  value of its actual  later dividends  .7 
They exploited statistical restrictions  based on the principle  that the 
later realization  differs from the market  expectation when the price is 
determined  by an expectation  error.  Their  main  point  was that  an expec- 
tation  or forecast must have less variance  than  the ultimate  realization. 
Simple calculations  for stock market  indexes suggested that this vari- 
ance inequality  failed by a large margin,  and Shiller  and LeRoy-Porter 
interpreted  the failure  as a sign  that  the market  did  not adhere  to the prin- 
ciple that the market  value of a stock is the present  discounted  value of 
its dividends.8 
Our  approach  moves in the direction  of a structural  model  of the stock 
market's  valuation  of a firm.  In the tradition  of Shiller  and LeRoy-Por- 
ter, we find a discrepancy  between the actual price of a stock and the 
price the stock should  be, given a simple  financial  valuation  model, but 
we go on to build a more elaborate  model that eliminates  the discrep- 
ancy. We basically make two kinds of elaborations.  One is to use dis- 
counting  formulas  that are closer to the exact prescriptions  of modern 
finance  theory. The earliest  literature  assumed  a discount  rate that was 
constant over time and over maturity.  We use discounts derived from 
data  on U.S. Treasury  securities  that vary from  year to year and do not 
have a flat  term structure.  With  respect to discounting,  we also explore 
the risk  premiums  suggested  by finance  theory. 
7. Shiller  (1981)  and  LeRoy  and  Porter  (1981). 
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Figure 1.  The S&P 500 Stock Price Index and the Risk-free Present Discounted 
Value of Its Future Dividends 
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Source:  Econiomic Report of the President,  1992, table B-91. 
The second type of elaboration  is to characterize  departures  of mar- 
ket values from financial  valuation  formulas  in terms of the observed 
characteristics  of firms.  We find  that  the market  tends to use higher  dis- 
count  rates  for firms  with unusually  high  earnings  and  tends to use lower 
discounts for firms  with unusually  high R&D spending,  unusually  high 
investment  in plant  and  equipment,  or unusually  high  debt. 
We look for effects on discount  rates, rather  than on the level of the 
market  value of a firm.  That  is, our findings  are of the sort, "A firm  that 
raises  its investment  by 10  percentage  points  in relation  to assets lowers 
its discount rate by 1 percentage  point"  rather  than "A firm  that raises 
its investment  by 10  percentage  points raises its market  price in relation 
to the present  value of its future  dividends  by 15  percent."  The reason  is 
simple. Many of the firms in our sample make a terminal  payment to 
their  shareholders  within  a year  or two of the time  we are  looking  at their 
share  price. The main source of these terminal  payments  is takeovers. 
In addition,  we take the 1991  share  price  as a terminal  payment  for firms 
surviving  to the end of our sample  period. Especially in the latter  case, 
we would  not expect the same  ratio  of theoretical  to actual  value  to apply 
when the terminal  payment  is just around  the corner  as when it is in the 
distant  future. 
Figure 1 shows this point clearly. We compare  the actual  level of the 
S&P 500 stock price index to the present value of actual future divi- 8  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure 2.  Value Shortfall for the S&P 500a 
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Source: See figure  1. 
a. The value shortfall  is the difference  between  the discounted  present  value of future  dividends  and the index 
price,  divided  by the index  price. See the text for details. 
dends, discounted  by the risk-free  discounts  implicit  in the Treasury  se- 
curities  market.9  The actual  value of the index in 1991  is taken  as the ter- 
minal  dividend. Two features are immediately  apparent  from figure 1. 
First,  the actual  market  is generally  far  below the present  value  of subse- 
quent  dividends;  the ratio  of theoretical  to actual  reaches  a peak  of close 
to 4 during  the early 1960s. Second, the gap disappears  as the terminal 
date approaches.  The average  ratio  of theoretical  to actual  value would 
not be an interesting  characterization  of the discrepancy  between the 
two. 
Figure  2 plots a measure  we call z, the value shortfall.  It is the differ- 
ence between the present value of future dividends, dT,  discounted  by 
R,T, and  the index price,  Pt, divided  by the index price, 
T 
E  Rt,  rd,  Pt, 
(  l  )  T  ~~~~~~~,=  t+ 
I 
Pt 
where t is the year of valuation,  as of the end of the year, T  is the year 
of fuiture  payout, and T is the terminal  year, either 1991  or the last year 
traded. 
If theory  and  reality  agreed  perfectly,  the value shortfall  would  be an 
unpredictable  surprise  that averaged zero. Instead, as in figure  2, the 
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value shortfall  is always positive, and the shortfall  declines to zero as 
the terminal  date approaches.  A higher  discount rate in the calculation 
of the present  value of dividends  could reduce  the value shortfall  in the 
right  way; the downward  effect would  be greater  in the earlier  years. Our 
method is to infer the excess discount rate from the value shortfall  by 
choosing  a rate  that  makes  the shortfall  as small  as possible. One econo- 
metric issue needs attention. Because the value shortfall  is calculated 
from the actual  future  dividends, we cannot use ordinary  least squares 
as the criterion  for a small  shortfall.  Instead,  we use nonlinear  two-stage 
least squares.  10  That is, we use instrumental  variables  known at time t, 
and thus uncorrelated  with the expectation  errors,  to measure  the mag- 
nitude of the value shortfall. Specifically, our criterion  is the sum of 
squared  residuals  from  the regression  of the value shortfall  on the instru- 
mental  variables. 
Our  procedure  is then simply  to regress  the value shortfall  on the in- 
struments,  with a correction  for serial correlation  (explained  further  in 
appendix B), for different discounts until we find the discount that 
makes  the regression  have its lowest explanatory  power. Standard  econ- 
ometric  methods  permit  us to recover  the standard  error  of the estimate 
of the extra discount. For the S&P 500, we use only the constant  as the 
instrument.  The econometric  procedure  then boils down to finding  the 
value of the extra discount that makes the sum of the value shortfalls 
equal zero. That value is 0.0426, with a standard  error  of 0.0032. The 
procedure  indicates that the discount rate should be 4.26 percentage 
points higher  than  the risk-free  discount  used in the calculations  for fig- 
ure 1. 
Finally,  figure  3 repeats  the comparison  of the actual  value  of the S&P 
500  stock price  index and  the present  value of its future  dividends,  using 
the estimated extra discount. Most of the problems of figure 1 are 
solved; it is not obvious that the discrepancies  are not simply  the result 
of expectation errors  about future dividends;  for example, the market 
may have been a little optimistic  in the late 1960s  and  a little pessimistic 
in the late 1970s. 
Figure  3 is about  as far as we can go with pure  time-series  evidence. 
Our  main  research  makes use of a rich panel of data on the majority  of 
publicly  traded  manufacturing  firms  in the United  States. The cross-sec- 
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Figure 3.  The S&P 500 and the Fully Discounted Present Value of Its Future Dividends  a 
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Source:  See  figure 1. 
a.  Figure 3 is similar to figure 1, except  that the fully discounted  present value  of future dividends  is discounted 
at a higher rate to minimize the shortfall. See  the text for details. 
tion dimension  allows us to associate valuation  discrepancies  with ob- 
served characteristics  of firms.  For example, one of our findings  is that 
the market  places a higher  value (that  is, uses a lower discount)  on the 
dividends  of firms  with  high  ratios  of investment  to total  book assets. To 
reach this conclusion, we use a specification  that makes the extra dis- 
count  depend  linearly  on the investment-assets  ratio.  We also use instru- 
mental  variables  that are derived  from  the investment-assets  ratio. The 
effect of this specification  is to assign  a higher  discount  rate  to firms  with 
higher  investment-assets  ratios, if the coefficient  of the variable  is posi- 
tive. As it happens,  the coefficient  is - 7.84 with  a standard  error  of 1.78. 
The interpretation  is that  firms  with more  investment  get lower  dividend 
discounts in the stock market, and thus higher market  values. A firm 
with 10  percentage  points  more  investment  in relation  to assets has a dis- 
count rate  that  is 0.784 percentage  points lower. 
We have already  noted  that  we view many  of our  firms  as making  ter- 
minal  payouts  to their shareholders  before  the end of our sample  period 
in 1991.  Our  valuation  method  is based on a particular  strategy  of a rep- 
resentative  shareholder  about  when  to sell. Our  specific  assumptions  are 
that  the shareholder  keeps his or her shares,  including  all dividends  paid 
in shares,  and  that  our  hypothetical  shareholder  takes all cash dividends 
as payouts. With respect to tender offers, we proceed in the following 
way: If the shares of a corporation  continue  to be traded  after a tender Bronwyn H. Hall and Robert E. Hall  11 
offer, our hypothetical  shareholder  does not sell to the tenderer.  Divi- 
dends from the new shares are treated as dividends from the existing 
share (that  is, a stock dividend  is treated  just like a split). If the shares 
do not continue to be traded,  the shareholder  sells at the last reported 
transaction  price. The proceeds of the sale are considered  the terminal 
payout.  If a firm's  shares  are still  traded  in 1991,  our  hypothetical  share- 
holder sells at the end of that year. Our  hypothetical  shareholder  pays 
no taxes on any transactions. 
Specification  and Instruments 
Our  interest  in this paper  is in the way that  market  discounts  are  asso- 
ciated  with  observable  characteristics  of firms.  For this purpose,  we use 
the following  model: 
(2)  Zit=  t  (xi,ty)  +  ui t  +  Ej,t. 
Here zi, is the value shortfall  calculated  by using  the standard  principles 
of finance  theory, >(xi  ,y) is an extra discount obtained  by applying  the 
vector of parameters  y to xi, , a vector of characteristics  of firm  i in year 
t. Each element of y tells how the corresponding  characteristic  influ- 
ences the market  discount  rate  applied  to the dividends  of the firm.  The 
disturbance  ui,, is noise in the firm's market  value not associated with 
the observed characteristics  of the firm, and the disturbance  Ei, is the 
error  in the market's  expectations  of future  dividends. 
We choose our  right-hand  variables,  xi t, so that  they are  uncorrelated 
with  the disturbance,  E  ,. That  is, we use characteristics  that  are known 
to the market  at the time that  the stock price  is determined.  Because ex- 
pectations are formed on the basis of our variables (along with many 
other  variables  that  we do not include),  the expectation  error  will not be 
correlated  with our variables  if expectations  are rational. 
Within  the wide group  of variables  known  at time t, we choose a par- 
ticular  group  to suit the purposes  of our research.  As we explained  ear- 
lier, our purposes  are quite  different  from  previous  work in finance  that 
has demonstrated  the existence of valuation anomalies. Finance re- 
search has shown-without  exception, as far as we know-that  vari- 
ables constructed  from  the current  stock price  are the best way to show 
that there are variables  known at time t that are correlated  with subse- 
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have broken down the observed relation  between the stock price and 
subsequent  dividends  into two components: 
(3)  Zi.=  rhit  +  Eit. 
Their research  has concentrated  on showing that overall noise,  h,t, is 
present. Our  procedure  is, in effect, to regress overall noise on certain 
characteristics  of the firm,  chosen to answer  the questions  that  motivate 
our research.  We thus break  down overall noise into two components, 
the part  associated with our selected firm  characteristics,  >(xi,, y), and 
a residual,  ui,,, which is uncorrelated  with the characteristics. 
It would be contrary  to our purposes  to include any right-hand  vari- 
able  that  is inherently  correlated  with  the valuation  error,  u  i,,. As a prac- 
tical matter,  this means  that  our right-hand  variables  should  not depend 
on the current  stock price. It would  be impossible  for the stock price  not 
to be correlated  with the valuation  error.  By analogy, in a standard  re- 
gression setting, one can never include as a right-hand  variable  a vari- 
able that is an important  part  of the left-hand  variable.  To put the point 
differently,  we gain  nothing  by identifying  a firm  as having  the character- 
istic "undervalued  in the stock market"  and  then showing  that  underval- 
ued firms  suffer  higher  discounts  of their  future  expected dividends.  The 
inclusion of a variable  based on the stock price would bias the coeffi- 
cients of the characteristics  we are  interested  in, because  the stock price 
is correlated  with those characteristics. 
In this respect, our research  is fundamentally  different  from  work in 
finance  that seeks to show that there are undervalued  firms  and that in- 
vestment in those firms yields arbitrage  profits. We take that point as 
given and  ask to what  extent undervaluation  can be associated  with firm 
characteristics.  Our  results  do not identify  the most promising  arbitrage 
strategies.  To find them, we would include all possible variables, both 
firm  characteristics  and  pure  predictors  based on measures  of underval- 
uation  derived  from  the current  stock price. 
Although  we generally  interpret  our results  as showing  how the mar- 
ket discounts firms  with different  characteristics,  with the implicit  hy- 
pothesis  that  causation  runs  from  characteristics  to discounting,  we can- 
not rule out causation  in the opposite direction. This issue arises most 
acutely  for investment.  If firms  that  enjoy  purely  accidental  higher  valu- 
ation  and  lower  discounts  respond  by investing  more, investment  will be 
associated  with lower discounts  and higher  valuations.  For this reason, Bronwyn  H. Hall and  Robert  E. Hall  13 
we are cautious in placing an aggressive causal interpretation  on our 
findings. 
Stock Price Levels  or One-year Returns? 
There  is a dispute  within  finance  theory  between  proponents  of study- 
ing the levels of security prices (the tradition started by Shiller and 
LeRoy-Porter)  and the proponents  of studying  the returns  over fairly 
brief holding  periods (sometimes called the Euler equation  approach). 
John Cochrane  has argued  that there is no substantive  difference be- 
tween the two approaches.  " In our own work, the issue arises in terms 
of the serial correlation  of the combined disturbance  in our valuation 
equation,  ui,  +  E  i,.  If the serial correlation coefficient  is close  to  1.0, 
once we correct  for serial  correlation  with  an  autoregressive  transforma- 
tion, we will be dealing  with a variable  similar  to one-year returns. In 
that case, our finding  of higher discounts associated, say, with higher 
book earnings  could be reformulated  as persistently  higher  future  one- 
year returns  for a firm  with above-average  book earnings  in a particular 
year. 
On the other hand, if the serial correlation  is substantially  less than 
1.0, our approach  is different  from, and markedly  superior  to, the ap- 
proach  based on one-year  returns.  A lower serial  correlation  will arise  if 
the noise component  of the disturbance  is a large  part  of the story, and 
the serial  correlation  of the noise is much  less than 1.0. The serial  corre- 
lation  of the expectation  error  is inherently  close to 1.0. The superiority 
of our approach  is just the standard  econometric  point  that  an estimator 
is more  efficient  if it takes proper  account of the covariances  of the dis- 
turbances.  The effect of an autoregressive  transformation  with a coeffi- 
cient of close to 1.0 is to give very little weight  to low-frequency  move- 
ments of the left- and right-hand  variables.  Our  interest  is precisely in a 
low-frequency  phenomenon,  namely  chronic  excess discounting  of divi- 
dends  in general  and  those of certain  types of firms  in particular.  We get 
much more precise estimates of our coefficients if our autoregressive 
correction  uses a parameter  well below 1.0 than  if it uses a parameter  of 
0.9 or above. 
11. Cochrane  (1991). 14  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
Our  example of the S&P 500 illustrates  this point dramatically.  Our 
standard  error  for the excess discount  is 32 basis points. The serial  cor- 
relation  parameter  used in this estimate  is 0.40. In contrast,  the standard 
error  of the estimate  of the mean  of the excess return  is 220  basis points; 
the implicit  autoregressive  parameter  is around  0.94. If we repeat our 
method  with an autoregressive  parameter  of 0.94, we get a standard  er- 
ror  of about 190  basis points. 
In our panel data, however, we find serial correlations  of the excess 
valuations  of close to 1.0, so we do not achieve the sharp  results  that  are 
available  for aggregate  data. Noise at the firm  level appears  to be much 
more  persistent  than  at the aggregate  level. 
Relation  to the Work of Brainard, Shoven,  and  Weiss 
Our  work  has some of the same  objectives  as the major  project  of Wil- 
liam  C. Brainard,  John  C. Shoven, and Laurence  Weiss (BSW).  12 Their 
project  covered much more ground  than ours. We consider the valua- 
tions of particular  securities:  the common  stocks of firms.  BSW consid- 
ered the valuation  of entire  firms.  They viewed the holders  of the equity 
and debt of a firm  as having  access to the entire cash flow of the firm, 
while we look only at the value that the market  places on the dividends 
that managers  choose to pay to their  shareholders. 
BSW's major  theme was the collapse of the market  value of firms  in 
relation  to their  projected  cash flows from 1968  to the last year included 
in the paper, 1977.  At the time, the perversely  low level of the stock mar- 
ket loomed large in any analysis of corporate  valuation.  From today's 
perspective,  the depressed  stock market  of the 1970s  seems less signifi- 
cant. Figure  3 shows that the market  did undervalue  corporations  from 
1974  through  1979,  but  that  this undervaluation  was not severe by histor- 
ical standards.  The fairly close tracking  of actual stock prices and dis- 
counted future dividends in the 1980s makes the overall record seem 
much  closer to the predictions  of valuation  theory  than  the reader  of the 
1980  paper  would  think.  13 
12. Brainard,  Shoven,  and  Weiss (1980). 
13. Robert  Hall was one of the discussants  of the 1980  paper. He wrote, "Only  the 
surge  in stock prices since the authors  began  work  on this paper  threatens  to undermine 
its conclusion. . . Whatever  the explanation  of low market  values, the lesson seems to be 
to buy stocks."  R. Hall  (1980b,  pp. 506, 508).  This  is the only published  personal  financial 
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BSW's measure  of undervaluation  in the mid-  1970s  was much  greater 
than  the one shown  in figure  3. Part  of the reason  appears  to be that  divi- 
dend  payouts  were low at that  time relative  to earnings.  BSW projected 
levels of earnings  that did not materialize  as later dividends, it would 
appear. 
BSW considered risk within essentially the same framework  as we 
have adopted  in this paper.  In a subsequent  paper,  William  C. Brainard, 
Matthew  D. Shapiro,  and  John  C. Shoven pursue  risk  measurement  ex- 
tensively.  14 They use a conventional  measure  of the risk of a portfolio 
based on the covariance  of its return  with the market  return,  and also a 
novel measure  of "fundamental"  risk  based on the covariance  of a firm's 
earnings  with aggregate  earnings.  They find  that  the price of fundamen- 
tal risk  is surprisingly  low, although  there  is no question  that  fundamen- 
tal risk helps explain differences  in expected returns  among  firms. We 
hope to use similar  risk  measures  in future  research. 
Risk and Value 
Finance  theory  is unsettled  about  the measurement  of risk. In princi- 
ple, a household's marginal  utility of consumption  provides a logical 
way to measure  the extra  discount  that  should  be applied  to a risky  asset. 
What  matters  is the nondiversifiable  risk  of an asset. Once  the household 
has made the optimal selection of a diversified  portfolio, the risk dis- 
count for one asset should  be related  to the covariance  of the return  of 
that asset with marginal  utility. As the covariance  becomes more nega- 
tive, there is a greater  tendency  for the asset to pay less when times are 
bad, as measured by high marginal  utility. The consumption capital 
asset pricing  model  (CCAPM)  provides,  in theory, a complete  answer  to 
the question  of the pricing  of risk. 
The failure of the CCAPM  is notorious in finance theory. Sanford 
Grossman  and Robert  Shiller  showed that returns  on stocks and bonds 
have almost  exactly the same  covariance  with marginal  utility,  when the 
latter  is taken  from  a constant-elasticity  (constant  relative  risk  aversion) 
utility  function.  5 Thus  both stocks and  bonds should  have the same risk 
discount, and further,  it should be a tiny fraction  of 1 percent. In fact, 
14. Brainard,  Shapiro,  and  Shoven  (1991). 
15. GrossmanandShiller(1981). 16  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
stocks consistently  provide  returns  of about  5 percent  per  year  in excess 
of bonds. The CCAPM  gives no insight  into the premium  paid  by stocks, 
or, to put it differently,  it cannot explain why the market  prices stocks 
as if they were much  riskier  than  bonds. The same puzzle was explored 
further  by Rajnish  Mehra  and Edward  C. Prescott in their well-known 
paper.  16 
Lars Peter Hansen and Ravi Jagannathan  extended this line of work 
by asking  about  the stochastic  properties  of an unobserved  variable  that 
might  be playing  the role that theory assigns to marginal  utility.  17 They 
found that the volatility of such a variable  must be surprisingly  high in 
order  to rationalize  the equity  premium.  Cochrane  and Hansen  provide 
a detailed  summary  of the current  state of this line of thought.  18 
We verified  that  the covariance  of the dividends  of our  sample  of firms 
with marginal  utility  calculated  from  aggregate  consumption  was almost 
exactly zero. We concluded  that  the CCAPM  provided  no help  in under- 
standing  the substantial  extra  discount  that  the market  applies  to the div- 
idends  of our  firms  relative  to the future  returns  from  Treasury  bonds. 
An older view in finance  theory takes a more modest and empirical 
approach  to the pricing  of risk. The traditional  CAPM  (TCAPM)  takes 
no stand  on why a broad,  diversified  portfolio  like the S&P  500  is valued 
at a discount relative  to riskless securities. Rather,  it simply  takes that 
extra  discount  as data.  The TCAPM  prices  individual  risky  securities  by 
comparing  their  risk  to the risk  of the market  portfolio.  This risk  is mea- 
sured by regressing  the individual  security's returns  on the market  re- 
turn  to find  the beta. The risk premium  for the security  is just the beta 
times the market  premium  over the risk-free  rate. 
In principle,  the concept of return  that is relevant  in our framework 
of long holding  periods  is the dividend;  the beta shouild  be measured  by 
regressing  one stock's dividend  growth on the dividend  growth of the 
market  portfolio.  19  We experimented  with regressions  of this type, but 
found, as with the CCAPM,  that the covariances are essentially zero. 
The reason  that the TCAPM  yields sensible results  as normally  applied 
16. Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985).  Also see Mankiw  and  Shapiro  (1986). 
17. Hansen  and  Jagannathan  (1991). 
18. Cochrane  and  Hansen  (1992). 
19. Brainard,  Shapiro,  and Shoven  (1991)  make  the same observation  with  respect  to 
earnings;  they measure  the "fundamental"  beta by regressing  a firm's  earnings  on aggre- 
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is that  beta  is measured  from  returns  for very brief  holding  periods, such 
as one day. The high  covariance  of these returns  with the market  comes 
not from  changes in dividends,  but from changes in the market  capital- 
ization ratios  for dividends  that are common across stocks. Our  proce- 
dure  was to use an excess discount  of 5.28 percent  to discount  all of the 
stocks in our sample. 
The Critique of American Capitalism 
Many  economists, and even more managers  and noneconomist  com- 
mentators,  believe that  there  are  important  departures  from  the finance- 
theory model of the stock market.  Two important  recent statements  of 
this view by economists are by Michael  Porter  and by Kenneth Froot, 
Andre  Perold, and Jeremy  Stein.20  James Poterba  and Lawrence Sum- 
mers document  the extreme prevalence  of the view among  managers.2I 
In our  framework,  the critique  holds that  the market  systematically  dis- 
counts  the expected future  performance  of some types of firms  at exces- 
sive rates. Even though  this fact is known  in the market,  arbitrageurs  do 
not exploit the fact; they are too busy chasing  arbitrage  profits  available 
from short-term  trading  strategies. Managers  respond to the perverse 
market  valuation  of their activities by pursuing  projects  that are highly 
valued  and  avoiding  those that  are discounted  excessively. The critique 
has an important  international  comparative  element. In Japan  and Ger- 
many, there are significant  permanent  investors in firms who are in- 
formed  about the prospective performance  of firms  and are capable of 
and interested in arbitrage  to take advantage  of any valuation  failures 
that might  appear  in the market.  Consequently,  Japanese  and German 
firms  can invest in invisible activities, with negative effects on current 
earnings  but high  contribution  to eventual  performance,  from  which the 
U.S. firm  is barred.  In particular,  the Japanese  firm  can sacrifice  current 
earnings  by penetrating  huge markets with low prices, with high de- 
ferred  value once the markets  are fully developed. The comparison  of 
the Japanese  and U.S. auto industries  invites this interpretation. 
As Froot, Perold, and Stein emphasize, high  turnover  among share- 
20.  Porter (1992) and Froot, Perold, and Stein (1993). 
21.  Poterba and Summers (1993). 18  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
holders  is not by itself good evidence that  the United States  lacks invest- 
ors willing  to take long-term  arbitrage  positions. We know  that  the labor 
market  has high  average  turnover  rates  at the same time that  most work 
is done in the course of employment  relationships  that will last a large 
fraction  of a lifetime.22  Similarly,  in the stock market,  high  average  turn- 
over is completely  consistent with the existence of a significant  fraction 
of committed  shareholders  who will never sell. Froot, Peiold, and Stein 
cite evidence that  this is precisely  the case in Germany  and  Japan,  where 
turnover  rates  in share  ownership  are actually  higher  than  in the United 
States. In both countries,  banks  hold long-term  equity positions in cor- 
porations. By contrast, modern American capitalism has few  core 
shareholders.  Most shares are held by institutions  that are legally re- 
quired  to be extremely diversified  and are barred  from holding signifi- 
cant shares of the ownership  of any one corporation.  Moreover, these 
institutions  trade  all their  holdings  actively and  do not have traditions  of 
long holding  period  arbitrage. 
The United States has free entry in financial intermediation.  Al- 
though two  important types  of  intermediaries-banks  and mutual 
funds-face  major legal obstacles to long-term  arbitrage  in the stock 
market,  other  intermediaries  can operate  without  limitations.  Recently, 
three  funds  have entered  the market  with  the precise intent  of long-term 
arbitrage  based on "relationship  investing."  These are Allied Partners, 
created by Dillon, Read & Company, Corporate  Partners,  created by 
Lazard  Freres, and Lens, created  by Robert  A.G. Monks. These funds 
make sizable investments and typically take one or more board seats. 
In view of the general  responsiveness  of the U.S. economy to arbitrage 
opportunities  and the response that has actually occurred,  it would be 
unreasonable  to project  the continuation  of large  arbitrage  opportunities 
in the future.  Our  findings  support  the idea that arbitrage  has improved 
over time;  the U.S. stock market  put a higher  value on future  dividends 
in the 1980s  than  in earlier  decades. 
Porter  summarizes  the short  time-horizon  critique  of American  capi- 
talism  in these words: 
Because of their fragmented  stakes in numerous  companies, short expected 
holding  periods, and the lack of access to "inside"  information  through  disclo- 
sure or board  membership,  institutional  investors  tend to heavily base buy/sell 
choices on relatively  limited  information  that  is oriented  toward  predicting  near- 
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term  price movements.  They are driven  by the system to focus on measurable 
company  attributes,  such as current  earnings  or patent  approvals,  as proxies of 
a company's  value. The value proxies employed vary among  different  classes 
of companies  and can lead to underinvestment  in some industries  or forms of 
investment,  while allowing  overinvestment  in others.23 
Porter later explains  that "the dominant value proxy employed  by in- 
vestors  and analysts  is  current earnings,  which  has  a demonstrably 
strong effect on share prices."24 As evidence  in support of this view, he 
observes  that earnings announcements  tend to cause  changes  in share 
value.  But this evidence  is inconclusive  because  even  the strictest  fi- 
nance theory view with no arbitrage opportunities would hold that new 
information about earnings should cause  changes  in share prices.  Our 
framework provides a way to look for excess  sensitivity  of stock prices 
to earnings.  We look for an effect  of earnings on stock prices beyond 
what is merited by actual subsequent performance. If the critique is cor- 
rect and investors are using current earnings as an inappropriate proxy 
for subsequent performance, then we should find that firms with higher 
earnings enjoy lower discount rates for their future performance. In fact, 
we  find the opposite:  high-earnings firms suffer higher discounting  of 
their subsequent performance. 
Porter also identifies biases in the composition  of investment: 
The American  system favors those forms of investment  for which returns  are 
most readily  measurable,  due to the importance  of financial  returns  and  the lim- 
ited information  available  to investors  and managers.  For most companies, in- 
vestments in plant and equipment  with easy-to-measure  cash flows are more 
confidently  valued and justified than investments in R&D, training,  or other 
forms  where  the returns  are more  difficult  to quantify.  Intangible  assets such as 
reputation,  a technical  base, or information  systems are far more difficult  for 
value proxy and event forecast valuation  methods  to handle,  even though  they 
have a major  impact  on competitiveness.  Internally  intangible  assets are often 
not treated  as investments,  and  their  cash flows are hard  to assess.25 
For exactly the reasons Porter mentions, we lack data on many forms of 
intangible investment.  Future research may be able to develop measures 
of training, reputation, market development,  information systems,  cus- 
tomer and supplier relationships,  and other intangibles not reported in 
corporations' financial statements.  We are able to study the relationship 
23. Porter  (1992,  p. 8). 
24. Porter  (1992,  pp. 43-44). 
25. Porter  (1992,  pp. 63-64). 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
between hardware  investments  and the discounting  of subsequent  per- 
formance, with results that give considerable support  to the critique. 
Firms with higher plant and equipment  investment enjoy lower dis- 
counts and higher  share prices. We also look at two intangibles,  R&D 
and  advertising.  Here  our  results  are  mixed.  There  is weak  evidence that 
R&D-intensive  firms  enjoy  lower  discounts  of subsequent  performance, 
contrary  to the critique.  On the other  hand, the critique  finds  support  in 
our finding  that advertising-intensive  firms  suffer  higher  discounting  of 
future performance,  although  Porter and others have hardly stressed 
that  one of the failures  of American  capitalism  is to advertise  too little. 
One of the themes of the short  time horizon  critique  is that the situa- 
tion  has worsened  over time. Porter  notes that  institutional  shareholders 
rose from 8 percent of the market  in 1950  to 55-60 percent  in 1990  and 
that the average  holding  period  for stocks fell from seven years in 1960 
to two years in the 1990s.26 Burton  Malkiel  provides evidence that the 
market  valued  expected dividend  growth  much  less in the 1980s  than  in 
the 1960s,  which he interprets  as evidence that time horizons  of invest- 
ors in the stock market  shortened.27  (We will discuss his method  later  in 
this paper.)  Our  approach  to the issue of changes  over time is simply  to 
repeat our analysis for each of the three decades spanned  by our data. 
We find evidence of lengthening  time horizons or lessening excessive 
discounting  of future  performance. 
An important  element of the critique  of American  capitalism  is that 
managers  focus attention on current stock prices when the attention 
would better be placed on long-term  performance.  Obviously, in an 
economy where the market  gave the best possible valuation  of expected 
future performance,  the focus on the current stock price serves effi- 
ciency. But defective stock-market  valuations  based on value proxies 
will make managers  emphasize activities that affect the proxies favor- 
ably, contrary  to the dictates of efficiency. Because we use the bench- 
mark  of actual subsequent  performance,  which will include all the ad- 
verse effects of distorted  managerial  incentives, we cannot  comment  on 
this aspect of the critique.  Bronwyn  Hall looks at one important  aspect 
of this issue-R&D  investment-in  a  1993 paper,28  and Warren Farb 
considers  hardware  investment.29 
26.  Porter (1992, p. 59). 
27.  Malkiel (1993). 
28.  B. Hall (1993b). 
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Data 
We use a sample  of the great  majority  of publicly  traded  firms  in man- 
ufacturing assembled by  Bronwyn Hall in connection with earlier 
work.30  Data on year-end  stock prices, on terminal  prices due to take- 
overs, and  on dividends  and  other  distributions  to shareholders  are  from 
the Center  for Research  on Securities  Prices  (CRSP),  University  of Chi- 
cago. Data on balance sheets and operating  statements  are from Com- 
pustat.  Data  on "bullet  rates"  (the  implied  prices  of pure  discount  instru- 
ments) from the U.S.  Treasury securities market are taken from the 
work of Thomas S. Coleman, Lawrence Fisher, and Roger G. Ibbot- 
son.3'  We define  the variables  as follows: 
The stock price is the closing share  price on the last business day 
(of  the year, adjusted  for splits. 
The dividend comprises dividends or other cash distribution  to 
shareholders,  including  cash received from takeover or liquida- 
tion, or the terminal  stock price at the end of 1991.  Except for the 
terminal  stock price, we assume all dividends  are received in the 
middle  of the year. 
The discount  is the bullet  discount  rate  from  Coleman,  Fisher, and 
Ibbotson,32  multiplied  by 0.9472  raised  to the power  of the number 
of years into the future. 
Assets are the book value of plant,  equipment,  inventories,  and  in- 
vestments in unconsolidated  subsidiaries,  taken at the end of the 
year and adjusted  for effects of price  changes. 
R&D  is the spending  on research  and  development  during  the year. 
Advertising  is the spending  on advertising  during  the year. 
Investment  is spending  on plant  and  equipment  during  the year. 
Debt is measured  as the book value of outstanding  long-term  debt, 
taken  at the end of the year. 
30. Bound  and others  (1984),  B. Hall and others  (1988),  and B. Hall (1990).  The data 
set is the multigenerational  lineal descendent  of the heroic efforts of Arthur  Slepian  for 
Brainard,  Shoven, and  Weiss  (1980).  The results  presented  in this version  of the paper  are 
for about  half  the total  sample:  those based  on companies  whose fiscal  years  are  calendar 
years. 
31. Coleman,  Fisher,  and  Ibbotson  (1989). 
32. Coleman,  Fisher,  and  Ibbotson  (1989). 22  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
Earnings  are book earnings  per share,  after  deducting  interest  and 
taxes, not including  extraordinary  special  items, for the preceding 
year. (For example,  for the observation  using  the stock price as of 
December  31, 1986,  the earnings  are for the calendar  year 1985.) 
Value  shortfall  is as defined  in equation 1: the difference  between 
actual present discounted value of dividends and share price, all 
divided  by the share  price. 
We specify our  regression  as follows: 
The dependent  variable  is the current  value shortfall  less the serial 
correlation  coefficient  for  this year, multiplied  by next year's value 
shortfall. 
Independent variables consist of  the following ratios, plus a 
dummy  for each year, serially  transformed:  R&D-assets,  advertis- 
ing-assets,  investment-assets, debt-assets,  retained earnings- 
assets, and  dividends-assets. 
The instruments  used as predictors  of the independent  variables 
are specified as follows. We define the discounted  dividend pre- 
dictor as the current  dividend yield multiplied  by the sum of the 
future  discounts  from  this year through  1991  (see appendix  B for a 
more  complete  discussion);  the instruments  are a full set of annual 
dummy variables, the annual dummies multiplied by the dis- 
counted dividend predictor, the six firm characteristics,  the six 
characteristics  multiplied  by the discounted dividend predictor, 
and the six characteristics  multiplied  by the discounted  dividend 
predictor  with dividends  lagged  one year. 
Table 1  presents  descriptive  statistics  for the data:  mean,  median,  and 
interquartile  range (location of twenty-fifth  and seventy-fifth  percen- 
tiles). The information  in parentheses  alongside each variable  name is 
the trimming  criterion  we used for excluding  observations  based on the 
values of the variable. 
Note that both R&D and advertising  are small in relation  to assets. 
The low values of R&D and especially advertising  in the period 1964- 
70 result from the fact that many firms  omitted these items from their 
operating  statements  during  the 1960s.  (Financial  Accounting  Standards 
Board  reporting  requirements  for these items were instituted  in the early 
1970s.)  Because we include dummies  for missing data in our valuation 
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Table 1.  Statistics on Variables Used in Regressions 
Percent 
Variable  (cutoff)a  1964-90  1964-70  197140  1981-90  R2 
R&D-assets  (<50  percent) 
Mean  2.70  1.34  2.24  3.69  0.48 
Median  0.94  0.00  1.04  1.56  0. 19b 
Interquartile range  0,3.64  0,1.56  0,3.21  0,4.91 
Advertising-assets  (<50  percent) 
Mean  2.16  0.16  2.26  2.76  0.48 
Median  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.27b 
Interquartile range  0,1.94  0,0  0,2.00  0,2.73 
Investment-assets  (<50  percent) 
Mean  9.06  9.73  8.39  9.58  0.41 
Median  7.72  8.77  7.19  7.93  0.20b 
Interquartile range  5.06,11.5  6.23,12.3  4.77,10.6  5.06,12.2 
Debt-assets  (<200  percent) 
Mean  25.96  26.77  23.86  28.03  0.36 
Median  22.98  24.22  22.27  23.16  0. 19b 
Interquartile range  12.2,34.7  16.2,34.0  11.6,32.6  10.9,38.3 
Lagged earnings-assets  (<50  percent) 
Mean  16.66  26.13  17.41  12.50  0.57 
Median  9.90  16.18  10.13  8.52  0.29b 
Interquartile range  4.4,21.8  6.8,34.9  4.86,22.7  3.26,17.6 
Dividends-assets  (<20  percent) 
Mean  2.58  3.39  2.43  2.47  0.60 
Median  2.04  3.01  1.93  1.79  0.35b 
Interquartile range  0.72,3.46  1.82,4.33  0.90,3.11  0,3.42 
Value shortfall (<1000  percent) 
Mean  -5.29  -  23.82  7.22  -12.90 
Median  -17.83  -36.66  -7.23  -20.68 
Interquartile range  -  50.8,25.1  -  59.7, -0.2  -44.6,41.7  -  52.5,16.7 
Addendum 
Percent on NYSE  or AMEX  . .  .  100  72  58 
Number of observations  11,032  1,561  5,022  4,449 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on Compustat  and CRSP  data on U.S. manufacturing  firms.  For definitions 
of variables,  see the text. 
a. The values  at which  observations  were trimmed  are shown  alongside  the variable  names. 
b. The R2 is for the regression  of quasi-first-differences. 
our  estimates  of the effects of the two variables  on valuation  in the 1960s 
to be reliable. 
The next-to-last  line in table 1 shows another  important  feature  of the 
data. All our data  for the 1960s  come from  firms  listed on the two major 
exchanges-the  New York and the American (NYSE/AMEX). The 
sample includes a fair number  of over-the-counter  (OTC)  firms in the 
1970s,  and  even more  in the 1980s.  The composition  of the sample  shifts 24  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
toward  smaller  firms  over time. This feature  of the sample,  which seems 
to have little effect on our results, is dictated  by Compustat's  changing 
coverage  of firms. 
Results 
Table 2 shows our basic results for the entire  period, 1964-90. Each 
coefficient  shows the number  of percentage  points by which the annual 
discount rate applied  to future  dividends  increases for a unit change in 
the corresponding  firm  variable.  For example, the coefficient  of - 7.84 
for the investment-assets  ratio indicates that an increase in investment 
by the amount  of assets (that is, an increase of 1.0 in the investment- 
assets ratio)  lowers the discount rate by 7.84 percentage  points. Obvi- 
ously, differences  of this magnitude  are not found in the data. The sec- 
ond column of table 2 shows the effect on the discount in basis points 
for a one-standard-deviation  increase  in the corresponding  variable.  For 
example,  a one-standard-deviation  increase  in the investment-assets  ra- 
tio (an increase  of 0.060)  decreases the discount  rate  by 0.47 percentage 
points. 
Our  results show that  R&D-intensive  firms  enjoy lower discounts. A 
firm  that is one standard  deviation above average in its ratio of R&D 
spending  to assets has a discount about half a percentage  point lower 
than average. There is considerably more sampling variation in the 
estimate  of this coefficient  than  in the one for hardware  investment.  Ad- 
vertising-intensive  firms  face slightly  higher  discounts. Not only is the 
coefficient  small  in magnitude,  but  it is very small  in relation  to the statis- 
tical uncertainty  as measured  by the standard  error. 
On the other hand, firms  with high levels of investment  in plant and 
equipment  enjoy substantially  lower discounts  and  higher  share  values. 
The coefficient  of - 7.84 percentage  points represents  an important  ef- 
fect of investment  on discounting:  the discount rate is 47 basis points 
lower for a firm  that is one standard  deviation  higher  in the distribution 
of the investment-assets  ratio. The coefficient  is measured  with consid- 
erable precision, as shown by its standard  error of  1.78 percentage 
points. 
The results show that  debt has little effect on the firm's  discount  rate. 
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Table  2.  Coefficient  Estimates  for Firm  Variables  and Their  Corresponding  Effects 
on the Discount  Ratea 
Effect on discount 
of one standard 
deviation  increase 
Independent  variable  Coefficient  (basis points) 
Constant  - 2.02  ... 
(0.68) 
R&D-assets  -  11.87  - 51 
(6.75) 
Advertising-assets  2.49  14 
(3.83) 
Investment-assets  - 7.84  -47 
(1.78) 
Debt-assets  1.07  22 
(1.02) 
Lagged  earnings-assets  3.12  74 
(0.44) 
Dividends-assets  -0.44  1 
(7.55) 
Summary  statistic 
SER  30.21 
R  2  0.13 
Durbin-Watson  1.64 
Number  of observations  11,032 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on Compustat  and CRSP  data. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the current  value  of the shortfall  less the serial  correlation  coefficient  for the current 
year, multiplied  by next year's shortfall.  Two dummy  variables  for R&D  expenditures  equal  to zero and  advertising 
expenditures  equal  to zero have also been included  in the regression.  Standard  errors  are shown  in parentheses. 
discount rate 22 basis points higher. This finding  goes in the direction 
predicted  by finance  theory:  all else held  constant,  a more  leveraged  firm 
has higher  nondiversifiable  risk  and  a higher  discount  rate. But the coef- 
ficient  is not large,  and is only slightly  larger  than  its standard  error. 
Firms  with higher  book earnings  in relation  to assets have higher  dis- 
counts  in the market.  Far  from  favoring  the current  bottom  line, the mar- 
ket seems to place a lower value on a firm  with unusually  high  earnings. 
A firm  one standard  deviation  higher  in the distribution  of assets faces a 
discount  about  three-quarters  of a percentage  point higher.  The finding 
is statistically  unambiguous  and  is the most robust  of all of our  findings. 
Our  conclusion that an investor can beat the market  by selecting firms 
with  high  earnings  relative  to assets is an interesting  complement  to ear- 
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good strategy. Our  results show that the role of earnings  is more than 
just to normalize  the stock price. It is smart  to buy stocks with  high  earn- 
ings-price  ratios both because stocks with high earnings  are attractive 
and because stocks with low prices are attractive.  We have confirmed 
this point by including  the assets-price  ratio  in a variant  of the equation 
estimated  in table  2, but for reasons explained  earlier,  we do not pursue 
specifications  that  include  the stock price. 
We find  only a tiny effect of dividend  policy on discounting.  Because 
there  is relatively  little  variation  in dividends  compared  to the other  vari- 
ables, the standard  error  of the coefficient  relating  dividend  policy to dis- 
counting  is relatively  high. 
Table  3 breaks  the results  down by decade. Recall  that  the sample  for 
the 1960s  is made  up entirely  of firms  listed on the New York  or Ameri- 
can stock exchanges. The over-the-counter  market  is not represented  in 
the sample  until  the 1970s  and  becomes a much  larger  part  of the sample 
in the 1980s.  We estimated  the valuation  equation  separately  for NYSE/ 
AMEX firms  and OTC  firms,  and found remarkably  little difference.  A 
second prefatory  comment  is that the results  for the 1980s  are for much 
shorter  holding periods than for the earlier  decades, both because all 
firms  have terminal  prices in 1991  if not before, and because takeovers 
were much  more  common  in the 1980s. 
Most of the results are reasonably  consistent across the three dec- 
ades, after  consideration  of sampling  variation.  The R&D coefficient- 
showing  lower discounting  for firms  investing  in this form  of intangible 
capital-is  considerably  larger  in the 1970s  and 1980s,  although  for the 
1980s  this may be the result of sampling  variation  alone. The effect of 
advertising  on discounting  is very large  in the 1980s,  a puzzle we plan  to 
investigate more thoroughly  in future work. The effect of debt on a 
firm's  discount rate is small in all three decades. The adverse effect of 
book earnings  on discounting  is also confirmed  in all three decades and 
becomes conspicuously  stronger  in the 1980s. 
The addendum  to table  3 shows the fitted  discount  rate  for the median 
and  mean  firms  in the three  decades. The median  firm  has the character- 
istics of the median  values of the six firm  variables  calculated  over the 
entire  period  (the values of the variables  used to calculate  the discounts 
in table 3 are the same for the three decades; only the coefficients 
change).  The mean firm  has the mean values of the six characteristics. 
By both measures,  the discounts  fell dramatically  in the 1980s.  The dis- 
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Table 3.  Regression Results by Decadea 
Independent  variable  1964-70  1971-80  1981-90 
Constant  -0.57  1.11  -  3.57 
(1.19)  (0.65)  (1.49) 
R&D-assets  - 3.70  -15.78  - 20.50 
(12.03)  (7.70)  (13.57) 
Advertising-assets  - 37.88  0.38  11.40 
(10.91)  (4.63)  (6.48) 
Investment-assets  -2.45  -  8.74  -  11.72 
(3.80)  (2.59)  (4.33) 
Debt-assets  2.59  -2.13  -  1.11 
(1.56)  (1.27)  (2.16) 
Lagged  earnings-assets  2.57  2.27  6.30 
(0.78)  (0.62)  (1.35) 
Dividends-assets  - 3.45  18.50  42.79 
(9.69)  (10.79)  (15.60) 
Summary  statistic 
SER  39.53  37.05  31.41 
R2  0.05  0.14  0.01 
Durbin-Watson  1.46  1.37  1.51 
Number  of observations  1,561  5,022  4,449 
Addendum 
Discount rate of the median  firm  -2.94  0.07  -4.80 
(1.56)  (0.88)  (1.97) 
Discount rate of the mean firm  - 2.56  - 0.19  - 3.93 
(1.50)  (0.91)  (1.98) 
Source: See table  2. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the current  value  of the shortfall  less the serial  correlation  coefficient  for the current 
year, multiplied  by next year's shortfall.  Two dummy  variables  for R&D  expenditures  equal  to zero and advertising 
expenditures  equal  to zero have also been included  in the regression.  Standard  errors  are shown  in parentheses. 
firm  is the risk-free  discount plus 5.28 percent for the equity premium 
less the numbers  given in table 3. By the 1980s, the median  firm had 
gained back almost all of the equity premium  and the mean firm had 
made  about  a percentage  point less progress. 
Relation of Our Findings to Burton Malkiel's 
Our  results  offer  much  less support  to the hypothesis  of stock-market 
myopia  than  those of Burton  Malkiel.33  Whereas  we find  less myopia  in 
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the 1980s  than  earlier,  Malkiel  interprets  his evidence as showing  much 
more myopia  recently. Malkiel's  basic finding  is that the cross-section 
regression  of firms'  price-earnings  ratios on earnings  growth  forecasts 
of Wall Street analysts yields a much smaller  coefficient  for data from 
the 1980s  than  for data  from  the 1960s.  An additional  finding,  which he 
considers  highly  supportive  of worsening  myopia,  is that  much  of the de- 
cline has occurred  in the coefficient  of five-year-ahead  earnings  growth 
expectations, rather  than in the coefficient of one-year-ahead  expecta- 
tions. 
We believe that  the use of analysts' earnings  growth  forecasts would 
be a useful  addition  to our  own work.  At a minimum,  they would  provide 
extra predictive  power in our first-stage  regressions. However, we do 
not believe that Malkiel's  use of the growth  forecasts has much to say 
about  myopia. The problem  arises in his use of the price-earnings  (P/E) 
ratio  as the dependent  variable  in his regressions.  Much  of the cross-sec- 
tional  variation  in P/E ratios  in a given year comes from  transitory  fluc- 
tuations  in earnings.  A company  can have a lofty P/E either  because it 
has excellent long-run  growth  prospects  or because earnings  are tempo- 
rarily  depressed. Studying  P/E ratios  in a cross section would be analo- 
gous to studying  the average  propensity  to consume in a cross-section 
study of consumption.  Families  with temporary  declines in income can 
have average  propensities  to consume of unlimited  positive values; so 
can the P/E ratios of firms. And a family or a firm  that had a loss in a 
particular  year would  be a still bigger  problem. 
The regression  coefficient  of the P/E ratio  on earnings  growth,  as cal- 
culated  in cross sections by Malkiel,  does not have any tight  connection 
to finance theory. Rather, it depends on the details of the stochastic 
process governing  earnings.  The coefficient  is almost  infinitely  sensitive 
to the likelihood  of near-zero  earnings.  It is equally  sensitive to the treat- 
ment of firms  with negative earnings.  Changes  in the mean and disper- 
sion of earnings  over time can have large  effects on the cross-sectional 
regression coefficient. In the consumption literature, the analogous 
point is Milton Friedman's observation that the cross-sectional con- 
sumption  function  is different  for  farmers  than  for wage-earners  because 
farmers  have larger  transitory  components  of earnings.34  Had Friedman 
and others studying  consumption  in cross sections chosen to state the 
consumption  function  in terms  of the ratio  of consumption  to income (as 
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Malkiel  did for the stock market),  the differences  between farmers  and 
wage-earners  would  have been much  larger. 
The book earnings  of a corporation  are the creation of accounting 
rules, which changed a great deal between the 1960s and the 1980s. 
Earnings  are the shareholders'  residual after paying interest to debt- 
holders, so the probability  distribution  of earnings  was heavily affected 
by the increased  leveraging  of the 1980s.  Although  we do not have the 
data  to explain  why Malkiel  found such a larger  reduction  in his regres- 
sion coefficient  from  the 1960s  to the 1980s,  nor  to explain  why the coef- 
ficient is so stable from year to year within  each decade, we do not be- 
lieve that regressions  with the P/E ratio as the left-hand  variable  are a 
good way to study the issue of changing  myopia. 
The alternative  way to use Malkiel's  data would be to start  from his 
observation  that  a firm's  stock price,  p*, should  be related  to its current 
dividends,  dt, 
(4)  p*  rtd, 
under  the assumption  that  the current  term  structure  is flat  with interest 
rates for all maturities  at rt  and that dividends  will grow at the constant 
rate g, for the indefinite  future. If the actual share price, pt, is consis- 
tently lower than  p*, it means  that  the market  is shortsighted.  And if the 
shortfall  is greater  in the 1980s  than  in the 1960s,  it shows growing  myo- 
pia. Our  results suggest rather  strongly  that the first hypothesis would 
be supported,  but not the second. 
The Critique of American Capitalism in Light of Our Results 
As we noted in our opening section, our finding  that the equity pre- 
mium-which  defies explanation by  standard finance theory-was 
about 2.5 percent in the 1960s,  5 percent in the 1970s,  and 1 percent in 
the 1980s  supports  the hypothesis  that  the stock market  is systematically 
shortsighted.  It values payoffs in the more distant  future  at a low level 
compared  to similar  payoffs from government  bonds. This finding  sup- 
ports  the most basic element  of the critique. 
The critique holds that standard  hardware  investment-plant  and 
equipment-should enjoy higher  valuation  on its future  payoffs than  in- 
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nonhardware  areas. Our  results also support  this hypothesis strongly. 
Firms with high levels of plant and equipment  investment  have higher 
values in the market,  given their actual subsequent  performance.  The 
remarkably  high  positive coefficient  on one measurable  intangible-ad- 
vertising-also  supports  the critique,  but only in the 1980s. 
One of the central  propositions  of the critique  is that the U.S. stock 
market  forces managers  to aim  for maximum  reported  bottom-line  earn- 
ings, to the detriment  of investments that hurt the bottom line in the 
short  run  but provide strong  performance  in the longer  run. Our  results 
reject this proposition decisively. To the contrary, one of the most 
promising  long-run  arbitrages  suggested by our results is to buy firms 
that have unusually  high  current  earnings.  They are differentially  likely 
to yield high  ultimate  value to their  shareholders. 
Our  results  for intangible  R&D  are also somewhat  unfavorable  to the 
critique. In the two decades when R&D was generally  reported  in fi- 
nancial  statements,  it receives negative  coefficients, showing  that  an in- 
vestment  in an R&D-intensive  firm  has a higher  than  average  long-term 
payoff to an investor than a normal  firm. The statistical  confidence in 
this finding  is lower than  for the others  we have highlighted. 
A final  proposition  central  to the critique  of American  capitalism  is 
that  shortsightedness  has worsened  over time. Our  results  show  just the 
opposite. Although  the market  valuation  of the typical  stock in the 1980s 
was still  below the finance-theory  benchmark,  the shortfall  was smaller. 
The U.S. stock market  seems to be moving  toward  erasing  its puzzling 
tendency  toward  excessive discounting.  With  steady rises in stock mar- 
ket values since the mid-  1980s  (even counting  the collapse  of the market 
in 1987),  the problem  of overdiscounting  and  shortsightedness  may  have 
vanished  from  the market,  on the average,  in the 1990s. 
APPENDIX  A 
Derivation  of the Valuation  Equation 
Let: 
t  =  year of valuation,  as of the end of the year; 
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T  = terminal  year, 1991  or last year traded; 
i  =  firm identifier; 
di,T  = actual dividend  or distribution  to shareholders,  paid at end 
of year; 
Pi,t  =  price of share at year end,  ex dividend; 
yi t,T=  ratio of future dividend  to current  price, di,T  / Pit; 
RtCT  =  price in year t of $1 to be received  with certainty at end of 
year T; 
= discount rate for nondiversifiable  risk; and 
E,  = expected value, conditional  on information  in year t. 
The valuation  equation  from  finance  theory  is 
T 
(A-1)  P  = 
t  (1  -  )T-t  RCTEtdT. 
T=t+  1 
The  present  value  of the future  expected dividend  yield  of a stock should 
be equal  to the price  of the stock, with  the present  value  calculated  using 
the risk-free  rate  adjusted  for extra  discounting  at rate  +. The magnitude 
of the risk  adjustment  + depends  on the amount  of economy-wide  risk  in 
the dividends  of the stock. A stock has a higher  discount  if there  is a gen- 
eral tendency for its dividends  to fall in times of poorer  general  condi- 
tions. 
We rewrite  the valuation  equation  as 
T 
where R,T =  (1  -  YT- tRCT, the discount including the nondiversifiable 
risk factor. Our  work is concerned  with departures  in the market  from 
this valuation  model. Our general approach  is to look for excess dis- 
counts,  bi,t. Using the firm identifier, i, where appropriate, our general- 
ized valuation  model  is 
T 
(A-3)  Pit =  R,  (1 -  b,t)T-tEt di,T. 
T=t+  1 
We will find  it convenient  to restate  the valuation  model in terms of the 
dividend  yields as 
T 
(A-4)  1 =  E  Rt,T(1 -  8i,t)TtEtyi,t,T. 
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We define  the unexpected  element  of payouts as 
(A-5)  =i,  Yi  t,T  t  Et  Yi  .  t, 
and  define  the composite surprise, 
T 
(A-6)  ei,t=  E  R T (1  -i,t)Ttm,t,T. 
T  =  t+  I 
Then  we write  the valuation  model  as 
T 
(A-7)  1 =  ,  RtT (1 
-  i, t)  Yi,  t,T  Ei,  t. 
T=t+  1 
Our  next step is to linearize  the model in the excess discount, 8, around 
the point 8  =  0: 
T  T 
(A-8)  1 =  ,  R,  T YitT  -  i, t  E  (  t) Rt,  T Yi t-  Ei,  t 
T  =  t+  I  T  =  t+  I 
Excess discounting  contributes  a negative term to value, in which the 
discounted  future  dividends  are weighted  in proportion  to their  futurity. 
Next we define 
(A-9)  Zi  t  E  Rt T  Yi-  1, 
T  =  t+  I 
the realized  excess present  value of the future  dividend  yields. Now we 
can write  the valuation  equation  as: 
T 
(A-10)  Zi,t =  i .  (T  t) R,T  Yi, .T  +  Ei,  t. 
T=t+  I 
We define  ki, as the weighted  discounted  dividends, 
T 
T=t+  I 
We assume that the discount,  i ,t, can be written as a linear function of 
observed characteristics,  xit,, with parameter  vector y, and a random 
noise component,  ui,  ki,t: 
(A-12)  8i,t = xi tz +  Ui  tIki ,. 
Then  the valuation  equation  takes the simple  form, 
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The literature  on orthogonality  tests of valuation  equations  is closely re- 
lated to this equation.35  The literature  can be interpreted  as saying  that, 
absent noise, the realization  zi, is orthogonal  to any variable  observed 
at time t. Durlauf  and Hall noted that the fitted values from the regres- 
sion of zi, on variables  known  at time t provided  an estimate  of the time 
series of valuation  noise. The estimate is conservative in that the vari- 
ance of the fitted  value is a lower bound  on the variance  of the noise. 
The  difference  between  our  approach  and  earlier  work  on orthogonal- 
ity tests is easy to explain in this framework.  The orthogonality  ap- 
proach makes inferences about the importance  of the entire valuation 
noise, ki,  t xi, ty  + ui t, whereas we are interested  only in the first term 
and combine the second term  with the expectation  error.  The Durlauf- 
Hall method  could be used to make  inferences  about  the part  of our re- 
sidual that comes from valuation noise not associated with our vari- 
ables. The basic method  would  be to project  our  residuals  onto variables 
constructed  from  the current  stock price. 
APPENDIX  B 
Econometric Issues 
To estimate  the model, we define  the regressor  vector 
(B-1)  Xi,  =ki,xi, 
so the valuation  model  becomes 
(B-2)  Zi,  =  Xi,y  +  Ui,  +  Ei, . 
The distribution  of the disturbance,  t + Ei,t,  is distinctly  nonspheri- 
cal. By dividing  both sides of the valuation  equation  of the current  share 
price, we eliminate the most obvious sources of heteroskedasticity 
across  firms  and  across time. But there  is likely to be high  serial  correla- 
tion  of u +  E, because  it is a moving  average  of future  expectation  errors, 
and because valuation  noise may also be persistent. There is a simple 
transformation  that will make  the disturbances  of this equation  roughly 
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spherical  and yet retain  the orthogonality  of Ei, to the instrumental  vari- 
ables. Suppose that the serial  correlation  of the disturbance,  ui,t + Ei t, 
is approximately  the same for all firms  in year t; call the common value 
Pt, The standard  forward autoregressive transformation  of the data 
would  make  the covariance  matrix  diagonal,  but it would  destroy  the or- 
thogonality.  Instead,  we use a backward  transformation: 
(B-3)  ti .=  Zi  . -  PtZit+1 
We use the one-year  Treasury  bill discount  as an estimate  of pt.  We cal- 
culate transformed  left- and right-hand  variables using the backward 
autoregressive  transformation. 
Instruments 
The estimating  equation  is 
(B-4)  Zi,  Xi,y  +  ui,  +  Ei,. 
Each element of Xi, is the product  of a firm  characteristic,  xi t, and the 
weighted  realization  of discounted  dividends,  ki, The instruments  need 
to deal with the fact that ki, declines in value as t approaches  the termi- 
nal date. We use the variable, 
T 
(B-5)  h,=  E  (v-t)Rt,, 
T--t+  I 
which is eligible as an instrument  because it depends on information 
available  at t. Then  we use instruments  of the form, 
(B-6)  (div u  ,_j  IwAic s)  he  xi  cto 
or various lags, j, which should be the best predictors of xi, tki t. Comments 
and Discussion 
John Heaton: Bronwyn  Hall and  Robert  Hall consider  whether  the dis- 
counted  value of a firm's  future  dividends  is completely  reflected  in the 
firm's current  stock price or whether dividends  are discounted exces- 
sively because of investors' short  horizons. First, the authors  advocate 
forming  an appropriate  discount  factor  that  reflects  the aggregate  or un- 
diversifiable  risk  of a firm's  dividend  stream.  As in Robert  Shiller's 1981 
work, the authors calculate an ex post  rational  value of the dividend 
stream  by discounting  actual future dividends  using this discount fac- 
tor.  1 If the model  of the discount  factor  is correct, then any deviation  of 
the actual stock market  price from this ex post rational  price should  re- 
flect expectational  errors  and should  be uncorrelated  with current  infor- 
mational  variables. 
Instead  of considering  a general  alternative  to their  chosen model of 
the discount factor, Hall and Hall examine a particular  alternative  in 
which extra discounting  occurs because individual  investors cannot, or 
do not, properly  evaluate  activities  with very distant  payoffs  that  are  un- 
dertaken  by firms.  The authors  consider  whether  differences  in R&D  ex- 
penditures,  advertising,  investment expenditures,  debt, earnings, and 
dividends  across firms  affect the discount  factor  applied  to the firms'  fu- 
ture dividend streams. In other words, Hall and Hall ask whether the 
difference  between  ex post rational  stock prices  and  current  stock prices 
is correlated  with  variables  that  could  influence  investors'  effective hori- 
zons. To interpret  the results, these variables  are multiplied  by a dis- 
count  indicator,  so that  the level of discounting  can be easily calculated. 
If investors have short horizons, then they should discount firms  with 
high R&D investment  more heavily than firms  with low R&D, once a 
1. Shiller(1981). 
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correction  is made  for the firm's  riskiness  (that  is, once the correct  asset 
pricing  model is used). 
Hall and Hall find several results that run counter to the notion that 
investors have short horizons. For example, firms with high levels of 
R&D (relative  to assets) face lower discount  rates on future  dividends. 
Further,  firms  with high current  earnings  relative to assets face higher 
discounting.  This contrasts  with  the notion  that  firms  in search  of higher 
current  stock prices could follow a strategy  of increasing  current  earn- 
ings at the expense of future  earnings.  Further,  Hall and Hall find that 
the excess discounting  has been falling  over time for the median  firm  in 
their  sample.  This  provides  some evidence against  the notion  that  Amer- 
ican capitalism  suffers  from the effects of myopic investors. However, 
the authors  find  that  firms  with  larger  investment  in plant  and  equipment 
face lower discount rates-a  finding  that is consistent with the notion 
that investors  like the short-term  payoff  from  this type of investment. 
Essentially,  Hall and  Hall are testing  a particular  model  of asset pric- 
ing in which  the systematic  risk  is assumed  to be constant  over time and 
its risk premium  is given by the market  risk premium.  They are inter- 
ested in a particular  alternative  in which there is excess discounting  be- 
cause of certain  characteristics  of firms  investment  patterns  and earn- 
ings. Rather  than examining  the difference  between the current  stock 
price and  the ex  post  rational  stock price, a more  typical  way to proceed 
would be to ask whether the cross-sectional  pattern  of one-period  ex- 
cess returns  can be explained  by a simple  model such as the capital  asset 
pricing  model (CAPM).  It is not clear  why Hall and  Hall  did not proceed 
in this way. The paper  asserts that it is more informative  to look at dis- 
counted  dividends  instead,  but  these assertions  are  not substantiated.  In 
fact, as the authors  indicate,  their  correction  for serial  correlation  of the 
error  term  results in a specification  that is very close to examining  a re- 
turn  specification.  I suspect that similar  results  would  obtain  if Hall and 
Hall looked at one-period  returns  directly, so this is not likely to be an 
important  issue. 
An advantage  of the return specification  would be that the results 
could  be compared  with the large  literature  in finance  theory  that exam- 
ines whether  the cross-sectional  distribution  of asset returns  can be ex- 
plained  by a simple  risk  factor  such as beta. For example,  there  has been 
renewed focus on variables such as book-to-market  value, firm size, 
price-earnings  ratios, and  dividend-price  ratios  in explaining  differences 
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Hall and Hall dismiss such results because they often use the stock 
price as part  of the explanatory  variables.  However, the influence  of fi- 
nancial  variables  such  as book-to-market  value  and  price-earnings  ratios 
on excess returns  could be the result  of the short  horizons  of important 
classes of agents. For example,  Josef Lakonishok,  Andrei  Shleifer,  and 
Robert  W. Vishny examine whether contrarian  strategies  can be used 
to help produce  substantial  returns  with little risk.2  These strategies  are 
designed  to bet against  extrapolative  strategies  that  are based upon  past 
earnings,  dividends, and other measures of a firm's  performance.  La- 
konishok,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  argue  that  these strategies  work  because 
securities  markets  contain  important  institutional  failures.  For example, 
institutional  investors may pick stocks with a history of good earnings 
because these are easy to justify to clients, or investors  are afraid  of be- 
ing  wrong,  so they choose the same  stocks as everyone  else. In this case, 
the financial  markets  would  be quite  inefficient  and subject  to important 
short-horizon  influences  on the part  of institutional  investors. Further- 
more, this type of short-horizon  effect could only be captured using 
lagged  stock prices and  earnings  directly. 
The view that  deviations  from  the CAPM  reflect  important  market  in- 
efficiency  is certainly  not uniform.  For example,  Eugene  Fama  and  Ken- 
neth French interpret  the influence  of variables  such as book value-to- 
market value on excess returns as reflecting variation in systematic 
risk.3  In fact, the variables  that affect the discount factors in Hall and 
Hall's regressions  could be driving,  or reflecting,  differences  in system- 
atic risk not captured  by their  risk correction.  It would be interesting  to 
determine  whether  the variables  that Hall and Hall are using  have addi- 
tional  explanatory  power  over and  above book value-to-market  value or 
size, for example. This would help to shed some more light on this de- 
bate in the finance  literature. 
In general,  any inefficient  markets  or short  horizons  interpretation  of 
the rejection  of a particular  asset pricing  model is open to the criticism 
that  the problem  could  be that  the model  under  the null  hypothesis  is too 
simple.  For example,  Hall  and  Hall  assume  that  risk  premia  are  constant 
over time. As long as the stocks that  Hall  and  Hall  consider  do not admit 
pure arbitrage  (a violation of the law of one price), then there is a sto- 
chastic discount factor such that stock prices are given by the present 
2. Lakonishok,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1993). 
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discounted  value of future  dividends  and the terminal  stock price used 
by the authors.  Although  Hall  and  Hall  argue  that  the excess discounting 
is declining  over time, they need to consider  whether  arbitragers  could 
really  have used their  explanatory  variables  to make  relatively  risk-free 
returns.  If arbitragers  faced significant  risk in exploiting  these results, 
then Hall and Hall could simply be picking  up variations  in systematic 
risk, and not the horizons  of individual  investors. 
Regardless  of the problem  of interpreting  the rejections  of any simple 
model, Hall and Hall conclude that there is evidence against investor 
myopia and if anything,  this myopia is disappearing  over time. Based 
upon my priors  and their  evidence, in the end, I agree  with this conclu- 
sion. Also I find  the authors'  approach  of using  a very large  cross-section 
of firms  and of using variables  other than financial  variables  to explain 
differences  in returns  to be very interesting  and important. 
However, if I were a proponent  of the view that  American  capitalism 
suffers  from  myopia  induced  by informational  problems,  I would not be 
convinced  by these results.  This is because financial  markets  can be per- 
fectly efficient  in the sense that stock prices are the discounted  value of 
future  dividends,  but the dividend  or earnings  streams  of firms  could be 
distorted.  This point has been made  by Jeremy  Stein.4 
Stein argues  that managers  have better information  about  the future 
payoff of investments than do investors and that some correlation  in 
earnings  occurs over time. Further,  managers  care about the current 
stock  price  because  they are  worried  about  takeover  attempts,  for exam- 
ple. In this setting,  managers  have an incentive  to try to manipulate  cur- 
rent  earnings  to try  to fool investors  into  believing  that  the firm  is strong. 
For example, they may try to exploit current  market  share  to the detri- 
ment  of long-term  profit  to try  to boost earnings.  Investors  are  not fooled 
by this, however. Investors  predict  the future  course of earnings  know- 
ing that the managers  will play games. The stock price is given by the 
discounted  value of expected dividends  where the expectations  are cor- 
rect in equilibrium.  In this world,  managers  make  inefficient  choices and 
everyone is worse off because of the focus on current  stock price. How- 
ever, the stock price is the discounted value of future dividends. The 
problem  is that  efficient  capital  markets  can coexist with  inefficient  deci- 
sions by firms. Notice that the economic problem  is not caused by the 
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fact that managers  are reacting  to bad market signals that can be de- 
tected by looking  at stock market  returns. 
Hall and Hall recognize that this is a potential  limitation  to focusing 
on stock market  inefficiency. However, I think  that it must be empha- 
sized that tests of the efficiency of capital markets may have limited 
scope in evaluating  the economic significance  of the short horizons of 
U.S. investors. 
N. Gregory  Mankiw: There  is a common  perception  that  U.S. corpora- 
tions are in some sense short-sighted:  that managers  frequently  forgo 
profitable  opportunities  because the benefits  occur too far in the future. 
I have always been skeptical of this view because those espousing it 
rarely  provide much hard evidence. This paper by Bronwyn Hall and 
Robert  Hall is a welcome relief. The paper  attempts  to use the tools of 
modern  financial  economics to address  empirically  this issue of corpo- 
rate myopia. This effort is a timely one because some in the Clinton 
administration  seem prone to policies aimed at correcting  this alleged 
market  failure. 
One  can view this work  as addressing  the age-old  question, "If you're 
so smart,  why aren't  you rich?"  Rarely  in life is this smart-alecky  retort 
appropriate,  but in this case it is. If firms  are short-sighted,  then some- 
where there should  be money to be made. Those who assert that firms 
are  failing  to maximize  profits  should  be able  to give us a prescription  for 
creating  wealth. 
This paper  looks for such profit  opportunities  in the stock market.  If 
managers  maximize  current  shareholder  value, then business decisions 
will reflect stock market  valuations.  In this case, myopic decisionmak- 
ing implies  that stock market  valuations  are incorrect. 
Note, however, that  incorrect  pricing  of firms  by the stock market  is, 
as a logical  matter,  neither  necessary nor sufficient  for myopic manage- 
ment. One can imagine  a world in which the stock market  values firms 
correctly, yet managers  nevertheless  choose strategies  that raise earn- 
ings in the short run at the expense of the long run. Managers  might 
choose this course because high  current  earnings  would fund more  per- 
quisites, such as corporate  jets and lavish offices. In this world, man- 
agers  fail to maximize  shareholder  value. The only way to make  money 
is to take  over the firms  and  throw  out the managers.  This strategy  made 
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Alternatively,  one can imagine  a world  in which  the stock market  val- 
ues firms  incorrectly,  yet managers  nonetheless make the appropriate 
investment  decisions. In this case, managers  also fail to maximize  cur- 
rent shareholder  value, but they are maximizing  the value of a share- 
holder  who holds the shares  for the long term. The way to make  money 
in this world is to buy stocks that are currently  underpriced.  I will dis- 
cuss how to do that in a moment. 
Despite these two hypothetical  cases, I think  it is fair  to assume that 
incorrect  pricing  by the stock market  and  inappropriate  decisionmaking 
by management  probably  go together.  Managers'  compensation  is often 
based on the near-term  share prices of their firms. If the stock market 
values  firms  correctly,  only an incompetent  manager  would  fail to maxi- 
mize the market's  valuation.  And if the stock market  values firms  incor- 
rectly, only an exceptionally  scrupulous  manager  would ignore  market 
signals. It is safe to assume  that neither  case is the norm. 
For this reason, it is natural  to look for valuation  mistakes by the 
stock market  as a test of corporate  myopia. The primary  empirical  con- 
clusion in this paper  is that  the stock market  makes  systematic  mistakes 
that  are related  to observable  firm  characteristics,  such as investment  in 
plant  and  equipment. 
This  finding  is closely related  to a large  literature  in financial  econom- 
ics  showing that one can predict the excess  returns on individual 
stocks.1  The right  investment  strategy  is very simple:  buy stocks whose 
price is low relative  to fundamentals.  What  is striking  about  this litera- 
ture is that fundamentals  can be measured  in any of a variety of ways: 
book value, earnings,  cash flow, or dividends. Each of these strategies 
works  when considered  by itself, and  they work  even better  in combina- 
tion. The estimated size of the excess returns  is large-indeed,  larger 
than  those reported  in this paper. Picking  out-of-favor  stocks using any 
of these rules produces excess return  of about 2 to 3 percent per year 
over at least five years. 
Another  variable  that  seems to forecast  excess returns  in stock prices 
is growth  in sales. Stocks of firms  that have experienced  low growth  in 
sales over the past five years tend subsequently  to produce higher  re- 
turns.  This strategy  works when considered  by itself, and  it works after 
controlling  for price-earnings  ratios. When reading  this paper, I won- 
1. One  of the early  papers  in this literature  is Basu (1977).  For more  recent  work, see 
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dered  whether  the Halls' cross-sectional  regressions  are picking  up this 
effect. It seems possible that  the investment  rate is proxying  for growth 
in sales: low-growth  firms  probably  tend  to have low rates  of investment 
as well. 
The simplest  way to explain  all these results  is to appeal  to some form 
of market  irrationality.  If stock  prices  fluctuate  because of fads or animal 
spirits,  then  price-earnings  ratios  will  proxy  for the degree  of mispricing. 
Moreover,  if investors tend to extrapolate  past performance  more than 
they should, then past growth  might  also be a good proxy. 
Note that neither  fads nor excessive extrapolation  of past growth  is 
exactly the same as myopia  or excessive discounting.  There are a vari- 
ety of ways for stock prices to be irrational,  and  they are  fundamentally 
different.  We economists have spent so long studying  rational  behavior 
that  we are not very good at talking  about  irrationality.  Irrational  behav- 
ior is a much harder  problem.  In most environments,  there is only one 
way to act rationally,  but many  ways to act irrationally. 
Another  possibility  is that some statistical  or data  problem  has yet to 
be uncovered  that will discredit  all this evidence. I take this possibility 
seriously because that has been the fate of many past rejections  of the 
efficient  markets  hypothesis.  About  a decade  ago, Robert  Shiller's  pion- 
eering work on volatility tests seemed to make a convincing case that 
stock and  bond markets  were much  too volatile.2  Yet subsequent  work, 
by Marjorie  Flavin and others, showed some serious flaws in Shiller's 
approach.3  More recently, papers  by Eugene F. Fama  and Kenneth  R. 
French4  and  by James  M. Poterba  and Lawrence  H. Summers'  have ar- 
gued that aggregate  stock prices exhibit  long-term  mean  reversion. Yet 
even more  recent  work  by Myung  Jig  Kim, Charles  A. Nelson, and  Rich- 
ard Startz  has convinced me that the evidence for mean reversion  is so 
far  from statistical  significance  that  it is not worth  taking  seriously.6 
In this paper  by Hall and Hall, one troubling  aspect of the methodol- 
ogy is the computation  of standard  errors.  The standard  errors  are  based 
on the assumption  that the covariances among different  stock returns 
can be captured by adding time dummies to the panel regression. 
2.  Shiller(1981). 
3.  Flavin (1983). 
4.  Fama and French (1988). 
5.  Poterba and Summers (1988). 
6.  Kim, Nelson,  and Startz (1991). See also the Monte Carlo results in table 7 of Man- 
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Clearly,  however, the actual variance-covariance  matrix  is more com- 
plex. At the very least, we know  that  stocks have different  betas;  that  is, 
they respond  differently  to aggregate  shocks to the market.  Moreover, 
there  are industry  effects that make  individual  stocks fluctuate  together 
in a way not captured  by time dummies. 
I fear  that  correct  standard  errors  could  leave the results  in this paper 
insignificant.  In a recent paper,  Josef Lakonishok,  Andrei  Shleifer,  and 
Robert  W. Vishny test for the success of contrarian  investment  strate- 
gies, such as buying stocks with low price-earnings  ratios.7  They com- 
pute standard  errors using a procedure that is more robust to cross- 
sectional correlations.  Although  the predicted  excess returns  they find 
are larger  than  those reported  in this paper, most of their  t statistics are 
only a little above two. 
Nonetheless, I expect the general  finding  of this literature-that ex- 
cess returns  can be forecast  with known  information-to hold up under 
closer scrutiny.  I have several reasons to believe this. First, the cross- 
sectional evidence is consistent with the time-series evidence. Ac- 
cording  to the time-series  evidence, when the aggregate  price-earnings 
ratio is high, as it is today, subsequent  stock returns  will be low.8 Sec- 
ond, the success of contrarian  investment  strategies  has been shown to 
work in other countries. It works even in Japan, where myopia is not 
supposed  to be a problem.9  Third,  the findings  of predictable  excess re- 
turns  have continued  long after  they have been noticed. In 1971,  Fischer 
Black  wrote  a paper  in which  he reluctantly  concluded  that  following  the 
recommendations  of Value Line produces significant  excess returns.'0 
Value Line makes  its recommendations  using  a complex strategy  based 
largely  on trends  in price-earnings  ratios. Since Black  wrote this article, 
Value Line's recommended  stocks have continued to outperform  the 
market,  suggesting  that  there  is more  to Value Line's system than mere 
luck.  "  I 
7. Lakonishok,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1993). 
8. Campbell  and  Shiller  (1988). 
9.  Chan,  Hamao,  and  Lakonishok  (1991). 
10. Black(1971). 
1  1. The  simple  strategy  of buying  stocks  with  low price-earnings  ratios  has  also contin- 
ued to work  well. See John  A. Dorfman,  "Which  Stock Picking  Strategies  Work  Best in a 
Turbulent  Market?"  Wall  Street  Journal,  May  20, 1993,  p. C1. That  article  notes that  such 
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Let me now turn  from  evidence to interpretation.  If we conclude that 
the stock market  values firms  incorrectly,  what does this finding  imply 
for public  policy? 
Let's take a concrete example. Right  now, Martin  Marietta  is selling 
for 10  times earnings  and Lockheed is selling  for 11  times earnings.  By 
contrast, Intel is selling for 23 times earnings,  and Microsoft  is selling 
for 31 times earnings.  What  does this literature  tell us to do? From  these 
price-earnings  ratios we can infer that the market  is excessively pessi- 
mistic about defense stocks and excessively optimistic about civilian 
high-tech  stocks. Clearly,  we should  buy Martin  Marietta  and  Lockheed 
and sell short  Intel and Microsoft. 
The advice  for policy is also clear.  The irrational  market  is placing  too 
high a premium  on resources in civilian high-tech  firms  relative to de- 
fense firms.  If managers  are responding  to these market  signals, as they 
probably  are, then they are excessively moving  resources  from defense 
to civilian high tech. Put simply, the right  policy is to impede defense 
conversion. 
Of course, I do not offer this advice seriously. It is noteworthy,  how- 
ever, that the Clinton administration  is pursuing  exactly the opposite 
policy. When  the administration  says that  we need a technology  policy, 
it is saying that the unfettered market  is not sufficiently  enthusiastic 
about  high  technology, despite high  price-earning  ratios  for the firms  in 
this industry. 
Whenever one is told that any market allocates resources ineffi- 
ciently, the correct  response  is, "Compared  to what?" I am prepared  to 
believe that  there  is some noise in stock prices. Some investors  are sub- 
ject to fads, irrational  extrapolation,  and myopia. Rational investors 
may  not be sufficiently  numerous  to insulate  market  prices  from  the irra- 
tional  ones. But before I accept the existence of some correctable  mar- 
ket failure, I must be persuaded  that government  policy is less faddish 
and  more  farsighted  than  the market.  The government  is not run  by om- 
niscient  social planners.  It is run  by bureaucrats  who, unlike  private  in- 
vestors, have little personal stake in whether their policies succeed or 
fail. Within  four  years, many  of these bureaucrats  will return  to comfort- 
able tenured  jobs in academia. To paraphrase  Lloyd Bentsen, I know 
these bureaucrats,  I have worked  with these bureaucrats,  these bureau- 
crats  are  friends  of mine, and  I would  rather  bet my money  on the ration- 
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General Discussion 
Several participants  suggested that the relationship  between firm 
characteristics  and the discount rate could reflect correlation  between 
those characteristics  and risk. Bronwyn  Hall agreed  to that  possibility, 
noting that the paper was not about arbitrage  possibilities in the stock 
market,  but rather  about the effect of firms'  fundamentals  on the stock 
price. She acknowledged  that  including  market  betas or other measures 
of risk would sharpen  the interpretation  of the paper's  results, possibly 
distinguishing  between the effects of risk and other factors on the dis- 
count  rate.  James  Tobin  suggested  including  what  he called  a fundamen- 
tal beta, which  would  measure  the covariance  of firm  earnings  with mar- 
ket earnings.  Andrei  Shleifer  suggested  that  the covariance  of firm  cash 
flow with market  cash flow would be a better  measure  than  earnings  be- 
cause book earnings are subject to substantial  manipulation.  Robert 
Hall observed that to be truly  fundamental  would require  using the co- 
variance  of dividends  with consumption,  but consumption  betas did not 
typically  perform  well. William  Brainard  hazarded  a guess based  on ear- 
lier work that none of a wide variety  of betas would explain  very much 
of the differences  in a firm's  risk  premiums  in panel data. 
Olivier  Blanchard  argued  that  differences  in the R&D-asset  or invest- 
ment-asset  ratios were probably  better indicators  of differences  in risk 
than differences  in beta coefficients. If these variables  continued  to be 
significant  even after  controlling  for betas, he would still be inclined  to 
interpret their importance as  information about riskiness. Andrei 
Shleifer  disagreed;  he was skeptical  about  interpreting  differences  in im- 
plicit discount rates as reflecting  differences in risk. He believed that 
out-of-favor  stocks, with low market  valuations  relative  to future  earn- 
ings and dividends, do not typically have higher betas or risk by any 
other  sensible  measure.  In his view, some observers  come close to mak- 
ing the explanation  of market  values tautological;  in effect, the predic- 
tion of excess returns  is taken as the measure of risk. Blanchard  re- 
sponded  that it is possible to avoid this extreme view while still arguing 
that particular  characteristics,  such as the ratio of R&D to assets, are 
associated  with the stochastic  features  of the earnings  profile  of a firm. 
Richard  Cooper  asked how the results are affected by investors who 
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explained  that  the paper's  measure  of returns  treats  the market  value at 
the end of the sample period, or when the firm  is taken over or liqui- 
dated,  as a terminal  dividend.  Brainard  observed  that  this treatment  pre- 
cluded  distinguishing  between the market  valuation  of capital  gains and 
dividends.  Robert  Hall defended  the use of the actual  terminal  price, ar- 
guing  that  it avoided  the problems  encountered  by Robert  Shiller  in syn- 
thesizing  prices  into  the future.  The method  gave firms  further  from  their 
terminal  dates  the most leverage  in the regressions,  reflecting  the greater 
information  content of these observations. 
Clark  wondered whether changing  the terminal  date would have a 
large  effect on the results.  Bronwyn  Hall  suggested  that  the major  conse- 
quence  would  likely to be a change  in the average  risk  premium,  but  that 
the estimated effects of individual  firm characteristics  would be less 
likely to change.  Anything  that  affects all firms  in the cross section more 
or less equally, such as the 1987  crash, would not alter  their  results. 
Shleifer  saw the key issue of the paper  as being whether  firms  invest 
in response to their  valuation  by the stock market.  He was surprised  by 
the paper's framework,  which assumed  that managers  took account of 
stock valuation, rather  than their own perception of future profits, in 
making  investment decisions. He referred  to work by Robert Vishny 
and  himself  which  found  that, controlling  for  future  prospects  of the firm 
using  variables  other  than  stock market  valuations,  the stock market  had 
little  effect on investment.  Robert  Hall  responded  that  the paper  was not 
about how managers  actually decide on investment, but rather  about 
how the market  values  what  they deliver  to their  shareholders  in the way 
of returns.  The paper  was not about  corporate  myopia,  but rather  about 
stock market  myopia. 
Tobin  observed  that some of the assets of a firm  are financed  by debt 
rather  than  equity, so that  any attempt  at valuing  the visible  assets of the 
firm  should  take into consideration  the value of the debt. Hence it would 
have been desirable  to study the dependence  of the total market  value 
of the firm  on firm  characteristics.Robert  Hall, while acknowledging  the 
feasibility  of taking  debt into account, felt that debt markets  do not re- 
spond  to news in the same  way as stock markets;  hence it would be nec- 
essary to distinguish  the nature  of the claims  that bonds and stocks rep- 
resent. 
William  Nordhaus  noted that  the firm  observations  were unweighted 
by firm  size. He observed that in order  to draw  implications  for Ameri- 46  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
can capitalism,  as was suggested  in the paper,  the firms'  characteristics 
would have to be weighted  by firm  size in order  to judge the importance 
of any under-  or overvaluation.  Nordhaus  further  observed  that  the puz- 
zles of excess returns  raised by the paper were not restricted  to U.S. 
stock markets. Excess returns have been found in other markets  for 
risky assets in the United States, as well as in stock markets  in other 
parts  of the world. Hall affirmed  that U.S. capitalism  was by no means 
unique  in this respect. Bronwyn H. Hall and Robert E. Hall  47 
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